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1Abstract
This study addresses the following questions in the context of a developing coun-
try. Do crimes increase following natural disasters? Does an upcoming election or the
presence of a strong local media, which potentially increases the incentive of the gov-
ernment to provide disaster relief, mitigate the eect of disasters on crime rates? I nd
that crime rates tend to increase following moderate to big disasters. Furthermore, a
higher pre-disaster growth of newspapers has a mitigating eect on the crime response
to disasters. Elections also inuence the crime response to disasters. Crimes are more
likely to rise following disasters in the years that are close to an election year.
Keywords: crime rate, natural disaster, role of media and elections, developing country
JEL classications: Q54, K42
21 Introduction
Natural disasters impose tremendous economic and social losses on the aected regions. Ac-
cording to the Annual Disaster Statistical Review, in the year 2007 alone natural catastrophes
cost the world at least $74,985.26 million and aected over 211,216,415 people worldwide.1
While there have been several investigations into the economic impact of natural disasters,
the social eects are relatively under-researched. The objective of this study is to answer the
following questions in the context of India. First, do crime rates tend to increase following
natural disasters? Second, does an upcoming election or the presence of a strong and vibrant
local media, which potentially increases the incentive of the government to provide relief in
the aftermath of disasters, inuence the crime response to disasters? Natural disasters occur
at regular intervals in developing countries and throw the population into deeper levels of
poverty. A spurt in the crime rates during these trying times imposes additional burden on
the aected regions. This paper deviates from other papers on natural disasters by using a
district as the unit of analysis.2 Due to data limitations most studies on natural disasters
have been able to use only state level or national level data. However, the eects of natural
disasters are often localized and a state or a country level analysis is not likely to be very
informative.
India is a good test ground for exploring the link between crime and natural disaster.
Geographic location is an important determinant of the disaster risk faced by a region. The
Northern tropic passes through the central part of India. This makes India prone to recurrent
natural calamities (see Figure 1).3 Furthermore, there is a lot of regional variation in the
crime rates across India. India is also the most populous democracy in the world with a well
functioning and independent press.
The study is focussed on three inland states (Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, and Bihar) and
1The Annual Disaster Statistical Review is published by the Center for Research on Epidemiology of
Disasters (CRED).
2Administratively, India is divided into various states, which are subdivided further into districts.
3Most natural disasters are concentrated in the region anked by the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of
Capricon.
3three coastal states (Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and West Bengal). The primary ndings of this
study are the following. I nd that crime rates, property crimes in particular, tend to increase
following moderate to big disasters. The results suggest that a higher pre-disaster growth
of newspapers is eective in curbing the spurt in crime rates following disasters, particularly
moderate to high intensity disasters. Plausibly, these events get a lot of coverage in local
papers and this translates into greater relief and lower crime rates. Elections also inuence
the crime response to disasters. The crime response to disasters is lower in the years that
are farther away from an election year, at least for the low magnitude events.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the economic literature on
crime and natural disasters. Section 3 explains the empirical model followed by a description
of the data in Section 4. I discuss the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Review of Literature
The literature on natural disasters Economic studies on natural disasters can be
broadly divided into three groups. One set of papers have identied factors such as income,
democracy, and geography (Kahn, 2005) and trade openness and education (Skidmore and
Toya, 2006) to be important determinants of disaster damages. Another group of studies
tries to assess the impact of disasters on individual decision making and on the economy.
Finlay (2009), for instance, nds that big earthquakes are capable of generating a fertility
response. Finally, there are studies that explore the determinants of disaster relief. In this
set of papers, the politics associated with natural disasters have particularly attracted the
attention of economists. Healy and Malhotra (2009) show that politicians under-invest in
disaster-preparedness expenditure vis-a-vis post-disaster aid. They attribute this to voter
myopia, which rewards incumbents for investing in the latter. In a recent paper, Besley and
Burgess (2002), the authors investigate whether a greater circulation of regional newspapers
is instrumental in raising the state government's responsiveness to oods and famines in In-
4dia. The authors theorize that a higher media presence reduces the information asymmetry
between aected and non-aected groups about the incumbent politician's eort level and
this motivates the incumbent politician to respond to disasters. The paper nds evidence
that a greater circulation of local newspapers enhances government activism following disas-
ters. The link between media coverage and disaster related relief has been established in the
context of international aid as well (Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007). These papers (Besley
and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007) provide the argument for using media
presence as a determinant of disaster aid in the current paper.
The literature on crime The literature on crime is vast. I discuss a handful of papers
that are closely related to my analysis. In the context of India, Dreze and Khera (2000) nd
that higher literacy levels, a lower share of SCST population, and a low female to male ratio
reduces the incidences of homicides in the cross-section of Indian districts. Prasad (2009),
demonstrates that the IMF induced economic liberalization program, which reduced the
protability of smuggling, also reduced the incidences of murders related to the maintenance
of turf ground. Iyer et al. (2009) explores whether crimes against women decline with a
greater political representation of women at the local and the state level. The paper nds
that crimes against women decline under a female Chief minister but increase with the share
of local female leaders. The results suggest that a greater representation of women at the local
level improves the reporting of crime and this plausibly accounts for the counter-intuitive
positive sign.
This paper integrates the literature on crime and natural disasters and considers whether
elections and media have a tempering eect on the crime response to disasters. The use of
elections is motivated by Levitt (1997) and Khemani (2004). The latter paper is focussed
on India and nds that incumbent politicians augment the mileage of National Highways in
the years close to an election. While this can have an independent eect on crime rates by
changing the marginal return to legal work, it can also have an additional eect in the face of
5a disaster, through better disaster preparedness. Analogously, a higher media presence can
inuence the crime response to disasters though post-disaster relief eorts as well as their
ability to cope with disasters.
Do crime rates respond to natural disasters in the Indian context? To explore
whether natural disasters inuence crime rates, I plot crime rates (murder rate and armed
robbery rate) against the occurrences of big disasters in Figures 2 and 3. I use an indicator
variable, which takes a value of 1 if the number of annual disaster related deaths exceed 5
or more per 100,000 populace. This captures the set of major calamities (such as the 1999
Super Cyclone and the 2004 Tsunami). The objective is to see whether there is a big spurt
or dip in the crime rates in the disaster year or in the year following the disaster. The rst
two graphs (focussed on Kendrapara and Puri district) trace the movement of crime rates
before and after the Super Cyclone of 1999, which hit the Orissa coast on October 29th. This
was the deadliest storm that hit India since 1971. The gures suggest that property crime
surged upward in the disaster year or in the year following that. The homicide rate surged
in Kendrapara but declined in Puri district. The next two graphs in each of the gures,
illustrate the impact of the Tsunami of 2004. It hit the state of Tamil Nadu on December
24 and claimed the lives of hundreds of people. Armed robbery rate increases slightly in
Kanniyakumari but remained unchanged in Cuddalore. Homicide rates do not seem to
have been aected by the event. Finally, the last two graphs focus on a major landslide
event (Nilgiri district of Tamil Nadu) and a severe ood (aecting Lucknow district of Uttar
Pradesh). There is clear evidence of a rise in both homicide and armed robbery rates in the
Nilgiris district following the landslide. Murder rates rose in Lucknow following the ood
but not armed robbery.
Overall, the gures illustrate that periods aected by disasters experience a change in
the movement of crime rates. The direction of change varies across the events. This suggests
that public goods provision plausibly varied from event to event. For instance, the Tsunami
6of 2004 received a lot of media attention due to its size as well due to the fact that it aected
several countries. This might have a led to a timely response in the aftermath of the event.
In contrast to this, according to Outlook, dated November 15, 1999, \Four days after the
super-cyclone hit Orissa, food, potable water and building material are nowhere in sight.
Every time an Indian Air Force (IAF) helicopter drops food, there is a murderous rush
to grab the packets.4 Despair is driving many rural people to loot trucks passing through
National Highways 5 and 6. The cyclone has come and gone but the devastation it has left
behind has benumbed the administration."
3 Empirical Strategy




















The district xed eects (
j
l's) capture the time invariant factors which aect the marginal
return to crime commission in a district. These include the probability of getting caught, and
disaster risk in a region. The time dummies (kt's) capture any aggregate shock that aected
all the districts in any year, for example, trade liberalization of the economy; ml;t is the set
of dummy variables indicating the occurrence of low, medium or high intensity disasters.
The base category is non-occurrence of disasters. The variable Gl;t=fyears until next state
election, entry of newspapers in the districtg.5 The coecient 
j
2 may be interpreted as
the marginal eect of Gl;t=fmedia, electionsg in disaster free periods. The partial eect at




3Gl;t). However, the need for disaster
relief arises only in periods aected by natural calamities. The coecient 
j
3 is incremental
eect of Gl;t on crime in periods aected by disasters. If elections and newspapers mitigate
4The Outlook is a weekly magazine from India
5An alternate measure of presence of newspapers in a region is the existing size of newspapers.
7the crime response to disasters, then 
j
3 should be negative. This could be attributed to
the provision of post-disaster relief measures as well as to better disaster preparedness, for
instance through better connectivity to other parts of the country. In a recent paper, Besley
and Donaldson (2010) demonstrate that railroads were helpful in curtailing the outbreaks of




4 Data and descriptive statistics
Natural disaster (mit) data The district level disaster information is compiled from
DesInventar and Disastrous Weather Events.6 The type of disastrous events covered in this
study include climatological, hydrological, meteorological and geophysical events. I exclude
droughts as the reaction time is much larger for this category of disaster. Based on the
aforesaid sources, I construct indicator variables for the intensity of the disastrous event.
The indicator variables in the DesInventar sample are based on the annual death toll in a
district: (i) 1 if disaster related death toll (per 100,000 people) is less than equal to 0.06,
0 otherwise (ii) 1 if the disaster related death rate is greater than 0.06 but less than 1, 0
otherwise (iii) 1 if the disaster related death rate is greater than 1, 0 otherwise. The excluded
category is disaster free periods. From the Disastrous Weather Events database, however, I
record only the highest magnitude disaster aecting a district in any given year. For instance,
if heavy rains precede ooding, I record only the latter event. This was done because unlike
death toll, which is available for DesInventar database there is no natural way of aggregating
across dierent types of disasters from the Disastrous Weather Events. The IMD assigns a
categorical measure to each disastrous event (for instance, oods are categorized as ash
oods, moderate oods, severe oods). A direct measure of loss is not available. Hence, I
construct indicator variables based on this categorical measure of disaster intensity.7 The
6Please refer to the data Appendix for details.
7The data is missing for the years 1990 and 1991 as the issues for these years were were not available in
Indian Meteorological Department, Nagpur.
8base category is non-occurrence of disastrous events. The advantage of using this database
is that it is prepared by an independent agency which does not have an incentive to over
report losses to attract federal aid. The DesInventar database is partially based on media
reports and therefore is subject to some over-reporting. To deal with this issue, I construct
another variable from the DesInventar database based on the frequency of disastrous events.
The advantage of using frequency of disasters is that it is less prone to measurement errors
compared to actual losses from disasters. Another advantage of using this variable is that
it is exogenously determined. The limitation of this measure is that one big event such as
the Tsunami may cause more losses in a district than a multitude of small events. Hence,
it is not clear whether multiple occurrences of natural disasters leads to more destruction
than one such event. The DesInventar sample covers ve states: Uttar Pradesh (1991-2006),
Uttaranchal (2001-2006), West Bengal (1991-2006), Tamil Nadu (1978-2006) and Orissa
(1973-2006). The DWE sample comprises of: Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa
(1986-2006) and Uttaranchal (2001-2006).8
Before proceeding further, I demonstrate the the two datasets convey analogous infor-
mation on disaster losses. In Table 3, I compare losses implied by low, medium and high
magnitude events as constructed from the DWE sample with losses of dwellings (where re-
ported) and human lives as recorded in the DesInventar database. Low magnitude events in
the DWE sample primarily consist of events such as heavy rains in a district. The medium in-
tensity events comprise of moderate earthquakes, ash oods to moderate oods and episodes
of severe heat waves.9 High magnitude events comprise of events such as severe ood, severe
cyclonic events, and the Tsunami. To arrive at the statistics reported in Panel A of Table 3,
I matched districts from the DWE sample with those in the DesInventar sample by year of
occurrence of the disastrous event.10 This exercise provides rough estimates of losses across
8The state of Uttaranchal was created from parts of Uttar Pradesh in 2001. The state of Jharkhand was
created from parts of Bihar in 2001; however, the disaster related information in unavailable for Jharkhand,
hence I drop Jharkhand districts from the sample.
9Heat waves can claim over 700 lives in India annually
10Owning to a large number of missing values for the houses damaged in disasters, the reported mean is
for non-zero observations.
9the two samples since the DesInventar sample utilizes information on annual losses from all
disasters, whereas the DWE sample is a record of the highest magnitude event only.
The gures show that low magnitude events are associated with much lower losses com-
pared to medium or high magnitude events. It is also interesting to note that a large fraction
of high magnitude disasters did not results in deaths. This suggests that perhaps factors
such as topography also play an important role in determining disaster related deaths. An-
other explanation is that in the case of some disasters such as cyclones, death toll can be
contained by timely evacuation, but the same is not true for property damage. While these
gures are informative of losses in an average Indian district, one may wish to repeat the
exercise by focussing on any one district. In Panel B, I focus on Nadia district in West
Bengal and compare the low, medium, and high intensity disasters based on the number of
people aected by the disaster.11 The gures from the Nadia district give me condence
that the categorization adopted by the IMD and more importantly my own categorization of
the dierent disaster types (into low disaster, medium disaster, high disaster) captures the
losses in the intended fashion.
How frequently do Indian districts get hit by disasters? Table 2 suggests that 52 % of the
sample (the unit of observation is a district-year) experienced a natural disaster. However, a
majority of these are low to medium intensity events. Only 6-7% of the sample experienced
a high intensity disaster.
Crime data The crime categories considered in this study are murder, armed robbery,
robbery, burglary, and theft. The crime rate is dened as incidence of crimes per 100,000
people. One might be concerned that certain crime categories such as thefts and burglaries
are underreported. An added concern is whether the reporting of crime changes in periods
aected by disasters. To the extent that crimes are under-recorded during these periods,
equation ( 1) will under-estimate the crime response to disasters. According to Table 2, the
11The information on death toll and the number of damaged houses was not available for all the three
years, hence the comparison is made on the basis of people aected
10mean murder rate in the sample of DesInventar states (Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
West Bengal, and Uttaranchal) is 3.55. The armed robbery rate is 0.55. The murder rate
surpasses armed robbery rate due to the fact that dacoity is a very special type of armed
robbery involving violence. As expected the burglary and the theft rate is higher than the
murder rate. In the Disastrous Weather Events sample, the murder rate is 3.88 but dacoity,
henseforth, armed robbery rises to 0.98. This is partly due to the fact that the sample
includes Bihar, which is well known in India for high incidences of crimes.
Media data Most Indian districts did not have local newspapers in the 1970's and 1980's.
Over the years, several districts have experienced entry of newspapers in their district. The
growth of newspapers is measured by the number of newly registered dailies in a district in
any given year. To alleviate concerns about endogeneity, I use ve year lagged values for
this variable. The average number of new dailies in the sample is 0.349 in the DWE sample.
Election data The time until next state election is a count measure that takes a values
of 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 if the earliest election is scheduled to take place in the current year,
one year away, two years away and so on. According to the Constitution of India, state
elections in India are to be held every ve years. However, on several occasions an elected
government has failed to last the full term due to shifting political alignment or owning
to deteriorating law and order situation in the state, in which case the governor dissolved
the assembly.12 This calls into questions the assumption of exogeneity of the timing of the
elections. Following Khemani (2004), I use an instrument for the election timing. Table 1
describes the construction of this variable. The scheduled and midterm elections are denoted
by S and M respectively. According to the table, in period 4, midterm elections take place
but instead of treating it as an election year, the instrument assigns it a value of 2. Every
year that follows an election year is assigned a value of 4 in the instrument variable. The
12Midterm elections usually take place when the party at the federal level and that at the state level are
non-aligned. For midterm election to take place, the governor of the state would have to dissolve the state
legislature.
11instrument and the actual election cycle diverge in the case of midterm elections. On average
most districts in the sample are 2.26-2.37 years away from the next election. In the DWE
(DesInventar) sample, actual elections and scheduled elections diverge in 43.8% (31.5%) of
the cases.13 The correlation between the actual cycle and the instrument is 0.90 and 0.88 in
the DWE and DesInventar sample respectively.
Table 1: Construction of the election variable
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Election S M S
Instrumented years to election 0 4 3 2 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2
Other Controls Previous studies have found that political competition is important de-
terminant of public goods provision in the Indian context. In this study, political competition
is measured by the index= 1-(party shares2). I use ve year lagged values to construct this
index. I club all the parties into four groups: Congress, Left, Hindu, and Regional.14 The
rst two have been in the election scene since independence. Their dominance has declined
in the recent years with the rise of regional parties and Hindu parties. The index of political
competition is a measure of party concentration. The index ranges from 0 to 1. A lower value
indicates that political competition in the state is low. The descriptive statistics suggest that
there is moderate level (mean level of the index is 0.47-0.49) of political competition in the
India states.
One might be concerned that the media variables are picking up the role of factors such
as urbanization. To deal with this, I include population density dummies in the regression.
I also control for the district literacy levels in the districts as reported in decennial census.
Additionally, I include two variables which vary over time at the state level: Total police
13This divergence is attributed primarily due to midterm elections and in a miniscule of cases due to the
imposition of President's rule which can postpone elections.
14The regional parties are primarily dominant in home states whereas the Congress, Left have presence in
almost all the states. The importance of Hindu bent parties varies from state to state.
12strength per km2 lagged by one period, and the fraction of state's total expenditure devoted
to development related expenses, lagged by one period. These variables are intended to
capture the existing quality of infrastructure just before the disaster hit, which in turn can
aect the provision of relief services. One might be concerned that past shocks to crime aect
police strength and development expenses, hence I include them only as a part of robustness
checks. The nal sample comprises of an unbalanced panel of 228 districts in the DWE
sample and 117 districts in the DesInventar sample. Several Indian districts split during the
period covered by this study. If a district retains its original name or inherits most of the
area of the original district, I treat is as the old district. All the other newly created districts
are included in the sample from that point onward. As a part of robustness check, I also
create composite districts, which are the original districts from the newly created districts.
This gives me a balanced panel of districts within each state.
5 Results
5.1 A: Basic Results
The baseline regression results of crime on natural disaster are reported in Table 4. The
results reported in Panel A uses the categorical measure of disasters from the DWE sample,
while Panel B and Panel C utilise the death toll measure and frequency measure respec-
tively from the DesInventar sample. The explanatory variables include the natural disaster
dummies, year dummies, district density dummies district literacy levels, and political com-
petition at the state level. Robust standard errors are reported throughout. The regressions
omit the election and media variables. The results reported in Panel A provides evidence
that armed robbery and burglary rate tend to increase following medium to large disasters.
Murder rate tends to decline following low intensity disasters. In the DesInventar sample
(Panel B), murder rate decreases following small disasters but increases in response to big
disasters. Panel C oers further evidence that natural disasters inuence the movement of
13crime rate. Relative to disaster free periods, the occurrence of a disaster is associated with a
rise in burglaries. The other crime categories do not seem to be inuenced by the frequency
of disasrers. However, if the availability of disaster relief inuences the crime response to
disasters, then the coecients on the disaster variables suer from the omitted variable bias.
In the regressions that follow, I use elections and media as possible inuencers of disaster
relief and preparedness.
Crime response to natural disasters and years until next elections The existing
evidence on India suggests that public goods provision is higher in the years close to an
election. The results in this study are supportive of this hypothesis. Note, for instance (Table
5, DWE and DesInventar sample), that the farther away is the next election, the higher are
the crime rates. This is true in the case of murder rates as well as property crimes such as
robberies and thefts. The coecient on the disaster dummies informs us about the crime
response to disasters in the election year (i.e. when the time until next election=0). Panels A
and B suggest that crime rates tend to increase following low to medium intensity disasters.
The results also suggest that proximity to elections inuences the crime response to disasters.
According to Panel A, the robbery rate signicantly increases by 0.255 (an increase of 11%
above the mean) points following low intensity disasters; however, the marginal eect of low
intensity disasters at the average on robbery is 0.012 and is insignicant.15 In the DesInventar
sample (Panel B), the marginal eect of low intensity disaster on the robbery rate in the
election year is 0.348. Moving from the election year to a situation where the next election is
four years away, the marginal eect drops to -0.256. Panel C uses the frequency measure of
disasters. The marginal eect of multiple disasters changes from 0.397 in the election year to
-0.207 when elections are four years away. Let us focus on murder and armed robbery rate.
The results in Panel C imply that relative to disaster free periods, the occurrence of multiple
disasters in a district is associated with 0.534 and 0.143 points increase in the murder rate
15This refers to the marginal eect evaluated at average level of G, in this case, G is years until next
election
14and armed robbery rate respectively in the election year. However, the partial eect at the
average of multiple disasters on the murder rate and the armed robbery rate is insignicant.
The results from the DWE and DesInventar sample diverge for the crime response to big
disasters. Panels B and C suggest that the crime rates increase following disasters whereas
Panel A suggests the opposite. The marginal eect of high intensity disasters at the average
on murder rate is 0.259 and signicant in Panel B whereas it is -0.090 and insignicant
in Panel A. The temporal and geographic coverage of the samples dier and plausibly this
explains the dierences in the results. Conventional wisdom suggests that the crime response
to disasters should be lower in the years close to an election as the incumbent politicians
strive to maximize their chances of an reelection. However, it is possible that the electorates
hold the politicians responsible for events outside their control (Cole, Healey and Werker,
2008) and this might have a demotivating eect on the politicians.
Impact of natural disasters on crime rates and newspapers In Panels A-C of Ta-
ble 6, I explore whether the growth of newspapers aects the crime response to disasters.
Unlike elections, the entry of papers into the districts does not seem to inuence crime rates
in the disaster free periods, except for armed robbery in the DWE sample. Recall, that I
use ve year lagged value of this variable to allay concerns about endogeneity. According
to Panel A, low intensity disasters are associated with a decline in the murder rate. Armed
robbery rate and burglary rate increases following medium to large disasters. For instance,
medium intensity disasters are associated with a 0.348 points and 0.506 points increase in
the burglary rate in Panel A and Panel B respectively. Even though this increase is small
when compared to the mean crime rate, during periods of disasters even slight increases in
crime rate could generate unrest among people. The marginal eect at the average of a
medium intensity disaster on the burglary rate is 0.292 and 0.409 respectively in Panels A
and B. Thefts tend to increase following high intensity (Panel B) and multiple occurrences of
disasters (Panel C). This represents an increase of around 6% over the mean rate. However,
15the entry of new papers is associated with a decline in thefts and burglaries in the face of
disasters. The reduction in thefts is evidenced from Panel B as well. According to Panel
B, high intensity disasters lead to a 1.260 points increase in thefts in the absence of entry
of new dailies, however newspapers tend to moderate this eect. The partial eect at the
average of response of thefts to high intensity disasters is insignicant. Murders tend to de-
cline following small disasters (Panels A and C). According to Panel B, disasters associated
with huge death toll are associated with an increase in the murder rate but a newspapers
help to curb this rise. With the entry of new papers in the market, the newspapers have to
compete for readership. This can favorably aect the quality of news reported in the papers.
Thus, apart from the possibility that these regions are able to attract higher post-disaster
aid, these regions are also likely to have a greater provision of public goods, for instance
good quality roads. This in turn could improve disaster preparedness of the region. An
alternate measure of presence of newspapers in a district is the existing number of dailies.
The results not reported here suggest that the pre-disaster size of newspapers is helpful in
reducing thefts in the face of disasters.
5.2 B: Robustness
The results reported above utilize variations in the elections timing and media as a proxy for
disaster relief. In the following regressions, I include additional controls,which might aect
the crime response to disasters. The rst control is one year lagged police strength per km
square at the state level. The second control is the share of development expenditure in the
state lagged by one year. A district is likely to cope with disasters better in the years when
the state spent more on the law and order and other development projects. To save space, I
report results from the DWE sample only. First I focus on elections (Table 7). The robbery
rate tends to rise following low intensity disasters but this response is higher in the years
closer to an election. The coecient on the interaction variable changes only slightly when
compared to Table 5. However, the coecient on the low disaster dummy is smaller and
16is signicant at 10% level only. The moderating role of elections for low intensity disasters
holds for murder rates as well. Overall, the coecients on the disaster dummies seem to be
muted in this regression when compared to Table 5. The results from the death toll and the
frequency measure (not reported here) are qualitatively similar to that in Table 5. Murder,
armed robbery, robbery and thefts tend to increase following disasters and a bigger media
presence helps to curb this rise. In Table 8, I revisit the link between crime and natural
disasters and newspapers. The coecient on the big disaster dummy increases slightly in
the armed robbery and burglary equation. The mitigating eect of newspapers on crime is
evidenced in this set of regressions as well. The results from the DesInventar sample are
again qualitatively similar to that found in Table 6. High intensity disasters are associated
with a rise in the crime rates (murder rate, robbery and theft rate when death toll measure is
used and armed robbery and theft rate when the frequency measure is utilized). The strong
mitigation in the case of thefts and high intensity disasters is found in this set of regressions
as well.
Another concern associated with previous regressions is that several districts split during
the sample period. Two of the controls included in the previous regressions political com-
petition and density of a district are likely to inuence the creation of new districts. Yet,
one might worry that there are omitted factors that are driving the results. To allay such
concerns, I calculate crime rate and other controls for the original districts throughout the
sample period. If results are driven by primarily by omitted factors then one would not be
able to reproduce the results found above. The downside of this procedure is that the xed
eect procedure is only able to account for time invariant omitted factors in the composite
districts. Potentially districts grow dierently after the split and this can result in a bias in
the regression results. This sample has 117 districts followed from 1986-2006 in the DWE
sample and 93 districts in the DesInventar sample with a sample size of 1914. Panel A in Ta-
ble 9 oers evidence that elections have a role in moderating the eect of disasters on crime.
For instance, the burglary rate signicantly increases by 0.421 points in these super-districts
17following low intensity disasters in the election year, however this partial eect is insignicant
when evaluated at the average. The results from the DesInventar sample (the results are
not reported here), suggest that the increase in crime following disasters in the years closer
to an election if not limited to property crimes but extends to murders as well. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged if police strength and share of development expenditure is
included in the model.
In Panel B, there is evidence that armed robbery, robbery, and burglary tend to rise
following low intensity disasters. Media has a moderating inuence on this relationship in
the case of murder rate, robbery and theft rate. In the DesInventar sample (the results are
not reported here), murders and robbery (thefts) tend tend to rise following high (moderate)
intensity disasters when measured by death toll. Media plays a role in crime mitigation
following disasters in the case of burglary (in the case of low intensity disasters) and theft (in
the case of low level to moderate disasters). Relative to disaster free periods, the occurrences
of disasters are associated with increases in burglaries (in the case of one disaster) and theft
(in the case of multiple disasters). A higher entry of papers helps to mitigate this response
in the case of thefts for both single and multiple occurrences of calamities. This result that
a higher media presence helps in moderating the spurt in crime in the face of disasters is
robust to the inclusion of police strength and share of development expenditure in the model.
This is true in the case of both the death toll and the frequency measure.
6 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to explore whether natural disasters lead to a rise in the
crime rates and whether the crime response to disasters depends on the timing of elections
and the strength of local media. I nd that crime rates, property crimes in particular, tend
to increase following moderate to big disasters. The results suggest that a higher pre-disaster
growth of newspapers is eective in reducing the impact of disasters on crime, particularly
18for thefts. Plausibly, disasters are covered in greater depth in local papers and this translates
into greater relief and consequently lower crime rates. Alternatively, a bigger media presence
is associated with a higher pre-disaster infrastructure, which augments the ability to cope
with disasters. Elections seem to have a demotivating eect on incumbent politicians when
faced with low intensity disasters. A greater distance from the election year is associated with
a lower spurt in the crime rates following disasters. Elections seem to inuence the crime
response to disasters in the case of murders and robberies whereas thefts and burglaries seem
to be inuenced by the presence of media.
This study highlights the role of media as a watchdog that possibly increases the account-
ability of the politicians and thereby aects the crime response to disasters. Furthermore,
the study highlights the importance of electoral incentives in eliciting a quick response to
disasters. If voters hold the incumbents responsible for events outside their control, then it
opens up the possibility that relief eorts will be lower and crime rates higher in the years
close to an election.
I conclude with some caveats and directions for future research. Due to the annual nature
of the crime data and also due to the low probability of occurrence, I am unable to distinguish
between the crime response to events such as oods, which primarily aect the poor and
events such as earthquakes, which aect the entire population. Furthermore, I ignore the
heterogeneity in the response to crime rates across the states. The study ignores the role
of newspapers in the neighboring districts. A priori it is not clear whether newspapers in
the neighboring districts are helpful in crime mitigation as some of the neighboring districts
will be from a dierent state (targeted at a dierent population and possibly in a dierent
language), which may/may not aect the electoral incentives of the incumbent politicians in
the home states.
In the future, it may be useful to look at the role of road and railroad expansion in
disaster mitigation. A better connectivity of the districts to other regions in the state and
the country, can directly aect the return to crime but it also improves disaster preparedness.
19Data Appendix
District crime data and state police strength The source of district crime data and
police strength at the state level used in this analysis is Ministry of Home Aairs, Government of
India, which publishes Crime in India on an annual basis since 1953. The district level data is
available from 1971 onward.
Natural disaster data The DesInventar database is available at www.desinventar.org. The
Disastrous Weather Events (DWE) is published by the Indian Meteorological Department. This
was supplemented with disaster records maintained by the Geological Survey of India. The low type
events in the DWE sample comprise of depression, heavy rains, moderate heat waves. The moderate
type events cover oods (ash oods, moderate oods, severe oods), landslides, earthquake, severe
heat waves. High type events comprise of severe oods and very severe cyclonic storms.
Election and media variables (Git) The election data is compiled from the EOPP stata
dataset and the website maintained by Election Commission of India.16 I largely follow the catego-
rization of parties adopted in Besley and Burgess (2000). For instance, \Left parties" in this study
comprise of Soft Left and Hard Left parties in Besley and Burgess (2000). The \Hindu parties"
comprise of BJP and the RSS. The \Congress and its allies" have been grouped into the category
Congress in my study. All other parties including independents are clubbed into the \Regional
parties" category. The data on the size of local/district media is available from \The Registrar of
Newspapers for India".
The information on literacy, population, population density of a district is available from the
decennial Census of India, 1981,1991, and 2001.
Development expenditure and total expenditure of the states This data is compiled
EOPP stata dataset and Database on the Indian Economy maintained by the Reserve Bank of
India.
16The author would like to thank Tim Besley for providing the EOPP stata datasets at his website.
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22Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
DWE sample DesInventar sample
Murder rate 3.880 2.460 3.542 2.392
Armed robbery rate 0.986 1.159 0.550 0.588
Robbery rate 2.301 2.172 1.931 1.815
Burglary rate 7.350 6.034 9.007 7.737
Theft rate 19.136 17.144 22.532 19.640
1 natural disaster (f1) { { 0.271 0.445
>= 2 disasters (f2) { { 0.252 0.434
Low 0.072 0.259 0.160 0.367
Medium 0.126 0.332 0.291 0.454
High 0.064 0.244 0.073 0.260
Years until state elections 2.255 1.354 2.370 1.329
New dailies* 0.349 1.205 0.403 1.374
Political competition* 0.493 0.162 0.477 0.177
Share of developmental expenditure** 0.582 0.074 0.591 0.083
Literacy 49.365 15.806 51.948 15.512
Total police per km2** 0.525 0.182 0.497 0.214
N=3357 N=2792
Notes: * and ** implies 5 year and 1 year lagged values are used
Table 3: Comparison of losses across DesInventar and DWE sample
Panel A: in the common sample of DWE and DesInventar
DWE variables
DesInventar variables
(Event type) Damage rate of
dwellings




low 684 5.66 43.95 77
medium 3141 13.3 38.35 332
high 6849 113.16 41.28 11653
Panel B: from West Bengal database
Event type District Disaster type Year People aected
low Nadia, WB heavy rains 2005 238443
medium Nadia,WB Rains and Flash
oods
2006 600000
high Nadia,WB Severe Flood 1999 1200000
Notes: Nadia is a district in West Bengal; death rate is number of disaster related deaths
per 100,000 population. Damage rate is number of houses damaged in disasters per 100,000
population and is calculated for a subset of the period, when the data was available.
23Table 4: Baseline results on crime and natural disasters
Y= murder armed robbery robbery burglary theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A DWE sample: Categorical measure
low -0.129** 0.088** 0.028 0.142 -0.212
[0.065] [0.037] [0.087] [0.213] [0.482]
medium -0.051 0.182*** 0.036 0.286* -0.283
[0.065] [0.052] [0.077] [0.173] [0.513]
high -0.082 0.208*** 0.146 0.845*** 0.344
[0.093] [0.057] [0.138] [0.280] [0.686]
N 3357 3357 3357 3357 3357
R squared 0.236 0.384 0.269 0.535 0.408
Districts 228 228 228 228 228
Panel B DesInventar sample: Death toll measure
low -0.128* 0.027 -0.003 0.224 0.256
[0.074] [0.027] [0.080] [0.240] [0.746]
medium 0.006 0.020 -0.054 0.371* -0.108
[0.060] [0.023] [0.076] [0.194] [0.576]
high 0.304** 0.038 0.220* 0.218 0.460
[0.118] [0.041] [0.132] [0.312] [0.636]
N 2792 2792 2792 2792 2792
R squared 0.342 0.297 0.285 0.628 0.511
Districts 177 177 177 177 177
Panel C DesInventar sample: Frequency measure
1 disaster (f1) -0.074 0.010 -0.046 0.313* -0.135
[0.058] [0.018] [0.064] [0.177] [0.526]
>= 2 disasters (f2) 0.104 0.054 0.057 0.292 0.522
[0.096] [0.035] [0.114] [0.288] [0.858]
N 2792 2792 2792 2792 2792
R squared 0.345 0.296 0.287 0.628 0.511
Districts 177 177 177 177 177
Notes: The other controls include district and time xed eect, literacy, political compe-
tition in the state, district density dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
24Table 5: District xed eect regression of crime on disasters: role of elections
Y murder armed robbery robbery burglary theft
mean YDWE 3.879 0.986 2.300 7.350 19.135
mean YDesInventar 3.542 0.550 1.932 9.007 22.531
Panel A: Categorical measure of natural disaster and election variables
low 0.032 0.097 0.255** 0.533 -0.230
[0.123] [0.069] [0.127] [0.477] [1.108]
medium -0.109 0.088 -0.084 0.399* -0.442
[0.097] [0.064] [0.100] [0.219] [0.635]
high -0.294** 0.030 -0.505*** -0.087 -1.482
[0.133] [0.085] [0.149] [0.356] [0.917]
years to election 0.045** 0.007 0.053** 0.226*** 0.448***
[0.018] [0.012] [0.021] [0.057] [0.113]
election*low -0.073 -0.007 -0.108** -0.189 -0.039
[0.045] [0.024] [0.044] [0.170] [0.418]
election*medium 0.030 0.046 0.058 -0.052 0.083
[0.040] [0.035] [0.038] [0.095] [0.286]
election*high 0.090* 0.077* 0.282*** 0.395** 0.766*
[0.053] [0.043] [0.078] [0.176] [0.434]
Panel B: Death toll measure of natural disaster and election variables
low 0.345*** 0.089** 0.348*** 0.264 1.045
[0.113] [0.036] [0.101] [0.371] [0.922]
medium 0.418*** 0.069** 0.206** 0.415 0.551
[0.106] [0.034] [0.102] [0.292] [0.859]
high 0.908*** 0.221*** 0.534*** 0.562 -0.042
[0.184] [0.068] [0.142] [0.487] [0.996]
years to election 0.230*** 0.026** 0.164*** 0.146 0.354
[0.038] [0.011] [0.037] [0.117] [0.247]
election*low -0.203*** -0.027** -0.151*** -0.013 -0.342
[0.040] [0.013] [0.037] [0.114] [0.279]
election*medium -0.178*** -0.021 -0.111*** -0.007 -0.253
[0.041] [0.014] [0.040] [0.115] [0.238]
election*high -0.274*** -0.078*** -0.147*** -0.159 0.176
[0.067] [0.025] [0.052] [0.177] [0.351]
Panel C: Frequency measure of natural disaster and election variables
1 disaster (f1) 0.377*** 0.054* 0.214** 0.303 0.031
[0.093] [0.029] [0.092] [0.284] [0.751]
>= 2 disasters (f2) 0.534*** 0.143*** 0.397*** 0.468 1.710*
[0.139] [0.044] [0.118] [0.413] [0.901]
years to election 0.229*** 0.023** 0.172*** 0.138 0.429*
[0.038] [0.011] [0.038] [0.121] [0.255]
f1*elections -0.193*** -0.018 -0.110*** 0.010 -0.058
[0.036] [0.011] [0.035] [0.099] [0.218]
f2*elections -0.193*** -0.039** -0.151*** -0.064 -0.474*
[0.044] [0.016] [0.044] [0.144] [0.247]
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
25Table 6: District xed eect regression of crime on disasters: role of new dailies
Y murder armed robbery robbery burglary theft
mean YDWE 3.879 0.986 2.300 7.350 19.135
mean YDesInventar 3.542 0.550 1.932 9.007 22.531
Panel A: Categorical measure of natural disaster and entry of new papers
low -0.126* 0.081** 0.008 0.276 0.640
[0.069] [0.039] [0.091] [0.214] [0.528]
medium -0.062 0.184*** 0.079 0.348* 0.389
[0.068] [0.056] [0.076] [0.179] [0.509]
high -0.052 0.212*** 0.158 0.937*** 0.784
[0.099] [0.059] [0.147] [0.296] [0.659]
new papers 0.003 0.027* 0.013 0.083 0.207
[0.029] [0.015] [0.049] [0.118] [0.291]
new papers*low -0.010 0.009 0.028 -0.290 -1.818***
[0.024] [0.016] [0.037] [0.241] [0.300]
new papers*medium 0.019 -0.007 -0.090* -0.157 -1.519***
[0.054] [0.015] [0.053] [0.129] [0.363]
new papers*high -0.079 -0.011 -0.036 -0.272 -1.351*
[0.062] [0.030] [0.088] [0.254] [0.735]
Panel B: Death toll measure of natural disaster and entry of new papers
low -0.113 0.026 0.018 0.334 1.070
[0.077] [0.028] [0.079] [0.244] [0.773]
medium 0.033 0.025 -0.000 0.506** 0.781
[0.063] [0.024] [0.075] [0.208] [0.479]
high 0.370*** 0.063 0.336*** 0.443 1.260*
[0.123] [0.043] [0.127] [0.331] [0.674]
new papers -0.019 -0.004 0.024 0.068 0.745
[0.034] [0.015] [0.050] [0.116] [0.508]
new papers*low -0.034 0.006 -0.035 -0.247** -2.015**
[0.044] [0.014] [0.052] [0.120] [0.801]
new papers*medium -0.063 -0.012 -0.118* -0.240 -1.867**
[0.038] [0.017] [0.062] [0.149] [0.876]
new papers*high -0.181*** -0.072** -0.314*** -0.576*** -1.891***
[0.061] [0.030] [0.071] [0.207] [0.684]
Panel C: Frequency measure of natural disaster and entry of new papers
1 disaster (f1) -0.046 0.014 -0.007 0.461** 0.771
[0.060] [0.019] [0.062] [0.185] [0.501]
>= 2 disasters (f2) 0.128 0.059* 0.112 0.419 1.383*
[0.100] [0.035] [0.111] [0.285] [0.780]
new papers -0.019 -0.003 0.025 0.064 0.723
[0.035] [0.015] [0.051] [0.116] [0.503]
f1* newpapers -0.069* -0.010 -0.090 -0.328*** -2.119***
[0.039] [0.014] [0.063] [0.095] [0.710]
f2* newpapers -0.059 -0.013 -0.126* -0.210 -1.742*
[0.043] [0.018] [0.065] [0.177] [0.908]
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
26Table 7: Crime response to disasters and elections: Robustness checks (DWE sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Y murder armed robbery robbery burglary theft
Low 0.059 0.092 0.253* 0.487 -0.212
[0.134] [0.069] [0.131] [0.474] [1.091]
Medium -0.037 0.079 -0.071 0.330 -0.382
[0.100] [0.065] [0.102] [0.217] [0.643]
High -0.134 0.056 -0.344** 0.169 -1.259
[0.135] [0.086] [0.148] [0.339] [0.929]
Years to election 0.053*** 0.006 0.055*** 0.220*** 0.455***
[0.018] [0.012] [0.020] [0.056] [0.114]
Election*low -0.081* -0.005 -0.107** -0.175 -0.045
[0.048] [0.024] [0.045] [0.171] [0.412]
Election*medium -0.000 0.049 0.051 -0.030 0.057
[0.039] [0.035] [0.038] [0.094] [0.289]
Election*high 0.058 0.066 0.233*** 0.295* 0.710
[0.054] [0.043] [0.078] [0.171] [0.439]
Share of state development
expenditure
-6.466*** 0.537 -1.846* 3.860* -5.892
[0.874] [0.410] [0.988] [2.257] [5.382]
Literacy -0.010 0.001 -0.008 -0.015 0.071
[0.009] [0.007] [0.014] [0.033] [0.051]
1 period lagged police
strength per km2
-3.368*** -1.567* -6.479*** -14.769*** -6.774
[0.967] [0.843] [1.509] [3.332] [9.421]
Political competition -2.161*** -0.701*** -4.930*** -8.815*** -7.714***
[0.343] [0.226] [0.530] [1.151] [2.314]
Low density district dummy 0.635* 0.069 0.380 1.617* -2.619
[0.329] [0.267] [0.487] [0.948] [2.356]
Moderate density district
dummy
0.148 0.284** -0.030 -0.358 -1.180
[0.188] [0.111] [0.241] [0.531] [1.226]
Constant 10.904*** 2.346*** 9.700*** 20.545*** 38.323***
[0.987] [0.442] [1.144] [2.332] [4.564]
Observations 3357 3357 3357 3357 3357
R2 0.269 0.388 0.293 0.547 0.413
Number of districts 228 228 228 228 228
Notes: Time dummies are also included.
27Table 8: Crime response to disasters and entry of papers: Robustness checks (DWE sample)
Low -0.121* 0.078** 0.003 0.252 0.639
[0.069] [0.039] [0.089] [0.207] [0.526]
Medium -0.052 0.181*** 0.076 0.322* 0.392
[0.068] [0.056] [0.074] [0.176] [0.507]
High 0.031 0.214*** 0.207 0.960*** 0.879
[0.100] [0.058] [0.146] [0.289] [0.658]
New papers -0.007 0.028* 0.011 0.092 0.199
[0.026] [0.014] [0.047] [0.116] [0.293]
New papers*low -0.007 0.009 0.031 -0.285 -1.813***
[0.023] [0.016] [0.035] [0.233] [0.295]
New papers*medium 0.021 -0.007 -0.090* -0.161 -1.518***
[0.052] [0.015] [0.054] [0.124] [0.360]
New papers*high -0.075 -0.010 -0.030 -0.261 -1.343*
[0.060] [0.030] [0.090] [0.264] [0.725]
Share of state development
expenditure
-6.418*** 0.543 -1.793* 4.176* -5.718
[0.857] [0.404] [0.983] [2.220] [5.519]
Literacy -0.011 0.000 -0.010 -0.019 0.068
[0.009] [0.007] [0.014] [0.034] [0.053]
1 period lagged police
strength per km2
-3.499*** -1.658** -6.848*** -15.401*** -7.921
[0.966] [0.840] [1.522] [3.318] [9.370]
Political competition -2.122*** -0.712*** -4.902*** -8.704*** -7.238***
[0.345] [0.225] [0.533] [1.150] [2.275]
Low density district dummy 0.660** 0.084 0.412 1.738* -2.350
[0.331] [0.270] [0.491] [0.945] [2.334]
Moderate density district
dummy
0.163 0.293*** -0.009 -0.287 -1.028
[0.190] [0.111] [0.243] [0.534] [1.228]
Constant 11.051*** 2.431*** 10.035*** 21.139*** 39.508***
[1.000] [0.445] [1.159] [2.329] [4.539]
Observations 3357 3357 3357 3357 3357
R2 0.267 0.387 0.288 0.544 0.418
Number of districts 228 228 228 228 228
Notes: Time dummies are also included.
28Table 9: District xed eect regression of crime on natural disasters in the original districts
Y= murder armed robbery robbery burglary theft
Mean 3.894 1.211 2.352 7.262 19.039
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Eect of elections
low 0.122 0.155* 0.421*** 1.318** 0.235
[0.145] [0.087] [0.148] [0.535] [1.212]
medium -0.075 0.111 0.065 0.637*** -0.274
[0.086] [0.072] [0.108] [0.236] [0.650]
high -0.334** -0.023 -0.429** 0.136 -0.740
[0.153] [0.088] [0.171] [0.425] [1.066]
years to election 0.045** 0.003 0.059** 0.250*** 0.487***
[0.022] [0.015] [0.026] [0.071] [0.158]
election*low -0.112** -0.013 -0.135*** -0.395** -0.044
[0.050] [0.030] [0.050] [0.190] [0.482]
election*medium 0.001 0.040 0.009 -0.161 -0.101
[0.039] [0.032] [0.043] [0.099] [0.303]
election*high 0.074 0.090** 0.229*** 0.395* 0.553
[0.054] [0.043] [0.079] [0.210] [0.493]
Panel B: Eect of entry of papers
low -0.121 0.141*** 0.137 0.630*** 0.900*
[0.074] [0.044] [0.087] [0.209] [0.464]
medium -0.069 0.228*** 0.152* 0.290 -0.174
[0.061] [0.049] [0.083] [0.201] [0.583]
high -0.102 0.192*** 0.127 1.080*** 0.837
[0.109] [0.064] [0.145] [0.355] [0.742]
new papers 0.016 0.040 0.013 -0.002 -0.131
[0.055] [0.026] [0.082] [0.175] [0.432]
new papers*low -0.033 -0.017 -0.030 -0.289 -1.009*
[0.038] [0.019] [0.062] [0.200] [0.514]
new papers*medium -0.017 -0.056** -0.111* 0.003 -0.587
[0.047] [0.024] [0.065] [0.151] [0.430]
new papers*high -0.119* -0.000 -0.039 0.012 -0.495
[0.061] [0.032] [0.080] [0.240] [0.688]
Observations 2671 2671 2671 2671 2671
R2 0.285 0.422 0.323 0.585 0.392
Number of districts 117 117 117 117 117
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Seismic, Volcanic and Tropical Storm Risk
Storm Season: May to Nov
Peak month: June
Datum: WGS84. Map data source: UN Cartographic Section, Global Discovery, FAO,
Smithsonian Institute, Pacific Disaster Center, UNISYS, Munich Reinsurance Group
Storm Season: May to Nov
Peak month: October
Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. 
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
The  bar  chart  below  show  the  degree  of  exposure  to
natural  hazards  and  the  percentage  of  area  affected.
Tsunamis and storm surges are a threat to coastal regions,
particularly  gulfs,  bays,  and  estuaries.  The  flood  hazard
results from river floods and torrential rain. The hazard of
dryness and drought is caused by major deviations from
the  normal  amounts  of  precipitation.  The  frost  hazard
depends on the elevation and the latitude.
(c)  2006,  Munich  Reinsurance  Company,  Geo  Risks
Research Department
All Natural Hazard Risks
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Earthquake intensity zones indicate where there is a 20% probability that degrees
of intensity shown on the map will be exceeded in 50 years.
Tropical storm intensity zones indicate where there is a 10% probability of a storm
of this intensity striking in the next 10 years.
Figure 1: India disaster risk
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